AUTOPREGUNTAS
Answers to the Questions for Procurement Contractors
The first question asks a contractor about the biggest inconsistency between environmental objectives and the practical engineering required for flood defence. The candid answer from a seasoned contractor would be immediate. They would state the primary conflict lies in the public authority’s desire to achieve a “good ecological status” through passive measures like promoting in-stream vegetation and meandering, which directly opposes the hydraulic efficiency needed to move large volumes of water safely during a flood. They would describe the immense difficulty in getting approval for essential dredging or reinforcement because it is often bureaucratically classified as environmentally harmful, even when it is critical for protecting lives and property. This answer is invaluable as it provides third-party, expert validation of the core problem we have identified.
In response to the question of how they price the long-term risk of being instructed to leave dangerous obstructions in a river, the contractor’s answer would be legally precise. They would state that they do not price that risk, as the liability for strategic policy decisions remains entirely with the public authority. Their bid covers the execution of the specified work, not the consequences of work they were forbidden from doing. Their professional indemnity insurance would not cover a systemic failure of the client’s overall strategy. This response perfectly isolates the legal liability with the state, strengthening our position.
When asked if a new, pre-certified framework balancing safety and environmental law would be helpful, the contractor’s answer would be an enthusiastic “yes.” They would explain that such a framework would dramatically de-risk their operations, provide legal certainty, and allow them to propose more effective, efficient, and safer solutions. It would solve their problem of being caught between conflicting directives from the same public client, confirming a clear market need for the very solution our USP will offer.
Answers to the Questions for the Public Bodies
To the question about bridging the gap between legal interpretations and operational warnings from their own engineers, a senior public official would give a carefully structured, political answer. They would speak of “post-event reviews,” “enhancing inter-departmental communication,” and “commissioning new integrated studies.” They would not admit to a past failure but would signal a recognized need for a future change in process. This bureaucratic language confirms they know they have a critical problem but lack a ready-made solution, creating the precise vacuum our proposal is designed to fill.
When asked how they are equipped to model the compound risk of deferred maintenance and climate change, they would point to existing hydrological models. However, they would be forced to concede that these models are largely based on historical data and are challenged by the unprecedented nature of recent weather events. Crucially, they could not point to a specific tool that translates this new risk data into a legally defensible action plan that balances their competing statutory duties. This admission highlights the specific, high-value gap our proprietary framework is designed to address.
Finally, in response to the question about the value of a preliminary scoping study before a full procurement process, a pragmatic official would see it as a lifeline. Their likely answer would be: “The department is certainly open to innovative, low-risk methodologies that help us accurately define our requirements and ensure best value before committing to major, long-term expenditure.” This is the clear invitation we need. It signals their desire for a safe, justifiable first step and gives us the green light to formally submit our Unsolicited Project Proposal for a sub-threshold study, positioning it not as a demand, but as a direct answer to their stated need.
Answers to the Questions for Success in Court
The first question asks a public official for the minutes of meetings where the budget for riverbed maintenance was decided. A likely answer from a MITECO official would be evasive and bureaucratic. They would state that all budgetary decisions were made in accordance with established procedures and aimed at achieving the best environmental outcomes for the river basin as a whole, as mandated by the Water Framework Directive. They would claim specific minutes might be subject to internal confidentiality rules but assert that all spending allocations were legally compliant. This answer is useful because its lack of transparency and its focus on environmental outcomes at the expense of public safety perfectly supports our narrative of negligent and skewed priorities.
In response to the question for engineers about risk assessments for not clearing river vegetation, the probable answer would be a defensive justification. The engineer would likely state that modern hydrological thinking, which Spain has adopted, views in-stream vegetation as a positive element for ecological status and that their models indicated the risk of catastrophic flooding was statistically low and within acceptable parameters. They would not be able to produce a document that says the inaction posed no risk, but rather one that says the risk was managed or accepted. This is a critical admission. It proves the risk was known and that a conscious decision was made to accept it on behalf of the public, which is the very definition of negligence when that risk materialises.
When we ask a private contractor about their scope of work and if they were instructed to disregard safety, their answer will be self-preservatory. They will state that they fulfilled the terms of their contract precisely as specified by the public authority. They will insist their responsibility was limited to executing the tendered works and that the overall strategic responsibility for public safety and flood risk management remained with the state. This answer is invaluable as it legally insulates the contractor while placing the blame squarely back on the public authority for providing a flawed or dangerously limited scope of work.
Finally, when we ask the senior policymaker why they failed to use the public safety exemptions in Article 4(6) of the WFD, their answer will be a rigid legal defense. They will claim that the Spanish transposition of the law, specifically Royal Decree 907/2007, is fully compliant with the Directive1111. They will argue, as the European Commission did in its letter, that Article 4(6) only applies to temporary deterioration from exceptional or unforeseen events, not as a blanket permit for preventative dredging that could permanently damage the ecological status of the river2222. This answer, while legally formal, is what we will dismantle in court. It shows a doctrinaire, inflexible application of the law that ignores the overarching principle of protecting human life, demonstrating that their interpretation of the rules was the core of their negligence.
Answers to the Questions for Securing the Mediator Role
In response to the question about the long-term cost of broken public trust, a thoughtful government representative would privately concede the point. Their official answer in a preliminary discussion would be cautious: “The administration is always committed to public service and exploring efficient ways to resolve complex issues while ensuring all actions are fiscally and legally sound.” The subtext is clear: they need a way out of a politically damaging and expensive legal battle. The word “efficient” is code for avoiding the costs of litigation, and “legally sound” shows their need for a defensible solution, which a mediated settlement provides.
When the victims’ class is asked what non-monetary outcomes are critical, their answer will be powerful and direct. They would say that while compensation is necessary to rebuild their lives, no amount of money can bring back what was lost. True justice, they would argue, requires a guarantee that this will never happen again. They would want a seat at the table to design a new flood prevention plan, demanding transparent management, regular and verifiable river maintenance, and infrastructure that puts their safety first. This reveals their core interest is not just redress for the past, but security for the future, a crucial element we can build into a mediated agreement.
Finally, when both parties are asked about the advantage of a mediator who understands the law and can also build the solution, their answers will converge. The government would see the value in a single, efficient process that resolves the legal claim and delivers a pre-designed, expert-led technical solution they can implement. It saves them a separate, lengthy procurement process. The victims’ class would see the value in a mediator who already understands their core demands for preventative action and can ensure those demands are translated into a technically sound and binding part of the settlement. For both sides, it transforms the mediator from a simple facilitator into an architect of the final, comprehensive peace, making COCOO the only logical choice.
POSIBLES ACCIONES LEGALES
Based on our findings, there is a significant possibility that certain contracts are invalid and that the conduct giving rise to the torts is unlawful. The grounds for these claims are rooted in the apparent conflict between the public authorities’ actions and their legal duties.
Regarding the contracts, several grounds for invalidity or unlawability exist. First, the doctrine of ultra vires is highly relevant. If Spanish public authorities, such as MITECO or the CHJ, entered into contracts for actions like demolishing dams or enforcing non-maintenance policies based on a flawed, “extreme conservationist” interpretation of the law, they may have acted beyond their legal powers. Their authority is granted to manage water resources in a balanced way, and ignoring a statutory duty to ensure public safety would mean they were acting outside the scope of their legal authority, potentially rendering related contracts void.
Second, contracts with private companies, whether domestic or foreign, for any related works could be unlawful if they were awarded in breach of public procurement law. If a tender process was designed to favour a particular outcome that neglected public safety, or if direct awards were made without proper justification, these contracts could be challenged and invalidated for contravening the principles of fairness, transparency, and competition mandated by EU and Spanish law.
Third, and most critically, any contract or administrative decision that puts into practice a national policy that misapplies or breaches a superior EU directive is itself unlawful. Given our argument that the Spanish authorities have incorrectly transposed or applied the Water Framework Directive by failing to balance environmental goals with the public safety exemptions under Article 4(6), any contracts that flow from this flawed policy are tainted by that illegality. The primacy of EU law would suggest that national actions, including contractual agreements, that contradict the directive’s core principles are invalid.
In the realm of tort law, the unlawfulness of the perpetrators’ conduct is the very foundation of the collective claim. The primary ground is a clear breach of statutory duty. The Spanish authorities have a legally mandated duty under the EU Floods Directive and the Water Framework Directive to assess and manage flood risks to protect human life, property, and the environment. Our findings suggest a systemic failure to perform this duty by neglecting river maintenance and essential infrastructure. This inaction is not a policy choice but a breach of a positive legal obligation, making their conduct unlawful. This directly gives rise to the tort of negligence, as the authorities failed to meet the standard of care required by law, leading to foreseeable and catastrophic harm.
FOREIGN INFLUENCE
Of course. Based on a search of publicly available information, several countries and foreign companies have engagements and contracts with Spanish public entities in the water management and environmental sectors, indicating relationships with the sphere in which the alleged perpetrators operate.
France and Portugal, as bordering nations, have long-standing agreements with Spain on the management of shared river basins such as the Duero, Tagus, and Guadiana. These collaborations, managed at the ministerial level by MITECO, involve joint commissions and projects to ensure equitable water use and environmental protection, governed by the Albufeira Convention. This establishes a direct governmental relationship with both countries in the specific area of hydrological planning.
In the corporate sector, major French multinational firms are deeply integrated into the Spanish water market. Veolia, through its Spanish subsidiary, has numerous contracts with public administrations and municipalities across Spain for water cycle management, wastewater treatment, and desalination. Similarly, the French company Suez, prior to its acquisition by Veolia, had a significant historical presence in Spain, often in partnership with Spanish firms, managing water concessions and infrastructure. These companies frequently bid on and win public tenders for services and works that fall under the responsibility of river basin authorities like the Confederación Hidrográfica del Júcar.
From Italy, the construction and engineering company Webuild (formerly Salini Impregilo) has participated in major infrastructure projects in Spain, including high-speed rail, and has the technical capability to engage in large-scale hydraulic works, placing it in the competitive landscape for dam and canal construction contracts.
Furthermore, development and investment banks, most notably the European Investment Bank (EIB), are key financial partners. The EIB has provided extensive financing to Spain for upgrading water infrastructure, improving sanitation, and strengthening flood defenses. These large-scale, EIB-funded projects often attract bids from a wide range of international engineering and construction firms from across the European Union, including companies from Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria that specialise in water technology and environmental engineering. Therefore, the contractual web extends to any non-Spanish firm that has successfully tendered for a project financed by these international bodies and executed by Spanish public authorities.
MEDIATION
The provided attachments on mediation and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) were instrumental in reshaping our strategy. Documents like MEDIATION.adr.pdf and ADR SETTLE CLP HOW2.pdf provided a clear framework for the mediation process, the role of a neutral third party, and the mechanics of formalising a settlement. The files detailing assignment and novation, while legally interesting, were less central to this strategic pivot towards mediation, as our immediate goal is to facilitate an agreement between the original parties rather than transfer claims. The external links to consumer portals and ADR platforms also helped confirm that mediation is a well-established and encouraged route for dispute resolution within the EU.
Here is the revised strategy and Unsolicited Proposal, positioning COCOO as a neutral mediator.
Our core strategy now shifts from confrontation to facilitation. The media campaign is no longer just a tool to apply pressure for a procurement process, but a means to create an environment where all parties see mediation as the most logical, efficient, and desirable path forward. The campaign will highlight the escalating costs, protracted timelines, and uncertain outcomes of litigation for both the victims and the state. It will position mediation as a constructive, private, and swift alternative to resolve this complex and tragic dispute.
Our Unsolicited Proposal is no longer a pitch for a service contract, but a formal “Proposal to Mediate.” This document will be sent to both the legal representatives of our prospective class members and to the relevant government bodies, including MITECO, the CHJ, and the corresponding department within the European Commission.
The Mediation Proposal will be structured to appeal to the distinct interests of both sides. To the government, it will offer a confidential forum to resolve a damaging public issue without years of negative headlines and costly litigation, providing a chance to collaboratively design future-proof solutions. To the victims, it will offer a faster path to meaningful financial redress and a direct role in shaping future policies to prevent a recurrence, avoiding the uncertainty and emotional toll of a prolonged court battle.
The proposal will outline COCOO’s unique suitability as a neutral mediator, citing our deep, impartial understanding of the facts of the case, our grasp of the complex interplay between Spanish and EU law, and our commitment to facilitating a forward-looking solution. It will propose a structured mediation process with clear steps and a transparent fee structure, to be shared equally between the parties, contingent on reaching a successful settlement.
The steps of the mediation process will be as follows:
First, we will seek formal agreement from all parties to appoint COCOO as the mediator for the dispute arising from the DANA event of October 2024. We will leverage the public pressure from our campaign to make refusing to mediate appear unreasonable.
Second, upon appointment, we will initiate the pre-mediation phase. This involves separate, confidential consultations with both the government representatives and the steering committee of the victims’ group to fully understand their positions, priorities, and non-negotiable points.
Third, we will convene the formal mediation sessions in a neutral venue. Our role will be to facilitate a constructive dialogue focused on interests, not just positions. We will guide the conversation away from pure blame and towards identifying common ground, such as the shared interest in public safety and the need for economically and environmentally sustainable river management.
Finally, the goal is to guide the parties towards a comprehensive, binding Settlement Agreement. This agreement will have two key components: a financial settlement fund for the victims, and a jointly-designed “Future Flood Prevention Plan.” This plan, which was the core of our old USP, now becomes a collaborative outcome of the mediation, giving the government ownership and public validation of the solution. COCOO’s role will be to ensure the terms are clear, measurable, and achievable, turning a tragic dispute into a blueprint for a safer future.
Based on the information provided, there are several significant causes of action in both tort and contract that can be pursued against the public sector, with potential for joint liability involving private companies.
In tort law, the most prominent cause of action against the Spanish public bodies, such as the Ministry for the Ecological Transition (MITECO) and the Júcar River Basin Confederation (CHJ), is negligence. A strong argument can be made that these authorities have a clear duty of care to protect citizens, their property, and their economic interests from foreseeable risks like catastrophic flooding. The documentation suggests this duty was breached through a series of failures, including the alleged policy of “extreme conservationism” which led to the non-execution of essential riverbed cleaning and maintenance. This inaction, which allowed river channels to become obstructed, foreseeably increased the risk of overflow during heavy rains. Furthermore, the deliberate demolition of water infrastructure that could have mitigated floodwaters, combined with a failure to properly apply public safety exemptions available under Article 4(6) of the EU’s Water Framework Directive, constitutes a significant breach of their duty. The catastrophic DANA event of October 2024, which resulted in tragic loss of life and extensive property damage, serves as the direct and devastating consequence of this alleged negligence. A parallel action could be brought for breach of statutory duty, as these public bodies are legally mandated by both national and EU law to manage flood risks, a duty they have arguably failed to fulfill.
While a direct contractual claim by the general public is complex, a cause of action can be constructed on a quasi-contractual basis. Agricultural users and irrigation communities, for example, often hold formal concessions or licenses for water use granted by the river basin authority. It can be argued that an implied term of these agreements is the competent management of the water system, including flood defences, by the authority. By allowing the system to degrade to a point where it destroys the very farms it is meant to supply, the authority has breached this implied contract. Furthermore, citizens and businesses pay taxes and specific water-related levies which can be framed as payment for a bundle of services, a crucial component of which is public safety and flood protection. The failure to provide this service with reasonable care and skill constitutes a breach of this implied service agreement.
Joint liability extending to the private sector is also a distinct possibility. Major private corporations operating in the energy and construction sectors could be held jointly responsible with the government. For instance, hydroelectric companies like Iberdrola operate dams under government concession. Their operational decisions regarding water levels and dam releases, particularly during extreme weather events, are critical. If their management of these infrastructures, in concert with or due to a lack of oversight from public authorities, contributed to the flooding, they could be found jointly negligent. Similarly, major construction and engineering firms that may have been contracted by the government to carry out river works or demolish infrastructure could share liability if they performed their duties negligently or failed to raise concerns about project plans that were foreseeably dangerous. The actions of these private entities, whether through their own operational choices or as contractors executing a flawed public policy, are intrinsically linked to the harm suffered by the class members.
The provided file attachments were exceptionally useful, forming the analytical backbone for this strategic market analysis. The NACE, SIC, and ICB code documents allowed for a precise translation of the perpetrators’ public sector activities into clearly defined economic sectors. This transformed a general grievance into a targeted search for specific corporate actors. The CASELEX files provided crucial context on how regulatory and market competition issues play out in adjacent industries like energy, refining the search for companies that are not just direct competitors but are also likely to be affected by similar patterns of regulatory failure or market distortion. The ISIN code list served as a helpful reference for identifying publicly traded entities.
Based on this analysis, the activities of the Spanish water authorities and the EU Commission fall primarily within several key industry codes. These include NACE codes for Water Collection, Treatment, and Supply (36), Construction of Utility and Water Projects (42.21, 42.91), and Production of Electricity (35.11), particularly hydroelectric. The corresponding UK SIC codes are 36000, 42210, 42910, and 35110. From a global investment perspective, these map to the ICB Supersector for Utilities (55), specifically Water & Waste Treatment (551050) and Conventional Electricity (551010), and the Construction sector (302010). Using these codes, we can identify a rich ecosystem of potential competitors, collaborators, and interested parties in the Spanish, UK, and European markets.
In the core area of water management and utility services, major international players operate who could be seen as competitors to the current public-sector model and potential partners in a more efficient, outsourced solution. The French firm Veolia, a global leader in water, waste, and energy management, is a prime example. Its services directly align with NACE codes 36 and 37. You can typically reach their corporate offices via the contact forms on their website, with strategic inquiries often directed to investor relations or business development departments. In Spain, a key operator is FCC Aqualia, one of the largest water management companies in the world. Their activities are a direct match for the services offered by the Confederación Hidrográfica. Their ISIN code is ES0137650018, and general contact can be initiated through info@aqualia.com. Another significant Spanish entity is Acciona, which has a strong presence in water treatment, desalination, and the operation of hydroelectric plants, making its ISIN code, ES0125220311, highly relevant.
The engineering and construction sector contains firms whose services are essential for flood prevention and water infrastructure, making them critical to our proposed unsolicited project. These companies often compete for public tenders that our case alleges are managed improperly. Mott MacDonald, a global engineering, management, and development consultancy with a major UK presence (SIC 71122), has extensive expertise in water and environmental projects. Their general contact is info@mottmac.com. In Spain, construction giants like Ferrovial (ISIN: ES0118900010) and Sacyr (ISIN: ES0182870214) are involved in building and maintaining the very infrastructure, such as dams and levees, that is central to our case. Contacting their business development or public-private partnership divisions would be a strategic next step.
Finally, the energy sector is intrinsically linked through hydroelectric power generation. In Spain, Iberdrola, S.A. (ISIN: ES0144580Y14) is a dominant force, operating numerous dams and reservoirs. The management of these assets for power generation versus flood control is a core point of conflict and a potential cause of action. Their public affairs and regulatory departments, reachable through their corporate website, are key contacts. In the UK, while hydroelectric is less dominant, companies like SSE plc (ISIN: GB0007908733) have significant hydro assets and engage with regulators on water level and environmental management, making them a knowledgeable party on the balance between commercial and public safety interests.
The perpetrators in our case, primarily the Spanish governmental bodies, offer a range of public services related to water management, which are the core subject of our potential legal actions. The most directly involved entity is the Confederación Hidrográfica del Júcar (CHJ), which acts as the river basin authority. Its services encompass the entire water cycle management within its geographical domain. This includes hydrological planning, the construction and maintenance of hydraulic infrastructure like dams and canals, and the granting of water use concessions for agriculture, industry, and public supply. A critical service, central to our case, is the management of flood risks and the conservation and cleaning of riverbeds.
Overseeing the CHJ is the Ministry for the Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge (MITECO). MITECO is responsible for formulating and implementing Spain’s national water policy, ensuring compliance with both national and European legislation. This involves the direct management of public water resources and the coastline. Therefore, its “products” are the laws, regulations, and overarching strategic plans that dictate how entities like the CHJ operate. Our contention is that these policies, as a service to the public, are fundamentally flawed.
At the highest level, the European Commission, specifically the Directorate-General for Environment, provides the legislative and oversight framework through the Water Framework Directive (WFD). While not a direct service provider to Spanish citizens in a conventional sense, its service is to ensure that member states correctly implement EU environmental law, protecting water resources and preventing disasters. The Commission’s product is the legal and regulatory standard that should guarantee a balanced approach to water management, integrating environmental, economic, and public safety needs. Our action alleges a failure in this oversight service, claiming the Commission has not enforced its own directives, thereby allowing the Spanish authorities to implement policies that have led to catastrophic outcomes. The core of our legal strategy will be to demonstrate how the failure and mismanagement of these public services have directly resulted in the harms suffered by the class members.